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Nichols: Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Confli

possibility that democracies grow faster
economically than other regimes and
thus accumulate more resources in the
long run. Such questions are minor,
though, and the overall case is quite
persuasive.
This book is a must for scholars of military effectiveness or civil-military relations. The statistical sections will satisfy
researchers; they might be a bit difficult
for general readers, but overall the work
should interest a broad audience of national security professionals. Desch’s
writing is excellent throughout, with
lively case studies and clear explanations of his theories and results.
One hopes that policy makers will read
this book. As Desch notes, democratic
triumphalism has become popular in
Washington. The mistaken belief that
democracy itself is a “force multiplier”
could lead officials to underestimate the
risks of U.S. interventions or to encourage unduly weak but democratic U.S.
allies. Desch offers a warning that it is
superior strategy, resources, and skill,
not the magic bullet of democracy, that
remain the keys to victory.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Doyle, Michael. Striking First: Preemption and
Prevention in International Conflict. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 200pp. $24.95

Even before the United States and its allies embarked on war in Iraq in 2003,
the question of whether it is acceptable
to strike enemies without clear provocation was an increasingly vexing one to
policy makers, academics, and legal experts. “Preemptive war” (attacking an
enemy who is clearly about to strike
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you first) has always been an acceptable
response to a dire and clear threat. But
“preventive war” (striking a potential
enemy while circumstances are favorable to the attacker, or striking in early
anticipation of a possible, or even only
theoretical, threat) has traditionally
been regarded in the international
community as not only unwise but
immoral.
In this slim, tightly reasoned volume,
one of America’s foremost foreignpolicy thinkers tackles the problem of
preventive war and reaches surprising
conclusions. While rejecting the
so-called Bush Doctrine, which putatively grants to the United States almost
unlimited permission to attack almost
any threat in any form, Doyle delivers a
clear warning that the previous rules of
war do not apply in the twenty-first
century. Doyle struggles (as have other
scholars in many nations over the past
decade) to find criteria that would allow preventive attacks in an internationally acceptable framework. He
settles on four criteria: lethality, likelihood, legitimacy, and legality.
The book is actually a collection of essays by four other scholars, who supply
a foreword and criticism of Doyle’s
chapters, to which Doyle responds in a
conclusion. The debate format is lively
and makes this work a particularly useful tool for introducing students at advanced levels to the subject.
Although Doyle’s prose is direct and
clear, in places he makes overly structured arguments, and his attempt to set
his four criteria into a matrix produces
something more like a rigid template.
Doyle certainly recognizes that the perception of a threat, versus the actual
threat, is often idiosyncratic and affected by a slew of factors, but his
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criteria are more likely to make sense
after the fact than at the outset of action. The moral questions he raises are,
and should be, crucial to policy makers,
but his framework is more suitable as
an after-action analysis than as a guide
to preventive attack.
That said, Striking First is an excellent,
thought-provoking, and highly readable
volume, indispensable for both specialists and interested general readers. No
future discussions of this problem (and
there will be many) can afford to ignore
Michael Doyle’s contribution.
THOMAS NICHOLS

Naval War College

Mahnken, Thomas G., and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds.
Strategic Studies: A Reader. New York: Routledge,
2008. 464pp. $49.95

Tom Mahnken and Joseph Maiolo will
not be unfamiliar to readers of the Naval War College Review or to students of
strategy and policy. Mahnken, a former
professor at the Naval War College, is
currently visiting fellow and professorial lecturer in the Strategic Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies; Maiolo is a senior
lecturer in war studies at King’s College
London. Seeking to enhance the teaching of this important subject, Mahnken
and Maiolo have put together a collection of previously published essays on
the theory and practice of strategic
studies.
This collection is wide ranging, both
topically and chronologically. It begins
by examining the uses of strategic theory, with essays by Bernard Brodie,
Lawrence Freedman, and William C.
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Fuller, Jr. The second section examines
the “classics,” with selections from Sun
Tzu, Basil Liddell Hart, and Thomas
Schelling. A look at conventional warfare on land, sea, and air is found in the
third section, in articles by Richard
Overy, Brian Holden Reid (on J. F. C.
Fuller), and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman on airpower in Kosovo,
along with a selection of Julian
Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. Nuclear strategy is not neglected, with a selection from Bernard
Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon and Albert Wohlstetter’s famous article “Delicate Balance of Terror.” The fifth, and
by far the largest, section is on irregular
warfare and small wars. The essays here
are both new and old classics: T. E.
Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung, David Galula,
David Kilcullen, Andrew Mack (on big
nations losing small wars), and Peter
Neumann and M. L. R. Smith (on strategic terrorism). To conclude, there are
essays by Andrew Krepinevich, Michael
Evans, Colin Gray, Adam Roberts, and
Hew Strachan (all since 2003), which
engage the future of conflict and of
strategy making.
One should not quibble too much with
the editors’ selections (or omissions);
Mahnken and Maiolo acknowledge
from the outset that space prevented
them from including all they wished.
Still, some readers may question the description of strategy that Mahnken and
Maiolo offer in their introduction. By
strategy they largely mean military,
rather than national or grand, strategy,
but they do not specify. In a collection
such as this, a more precise explanation
of strategy at the beginning would have
been helpful for framing the collection’s
essays. Nonetheless, this text will be extremely useful as a starting point for
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